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Abstract
This article explores how insurgencies emerge and spread within a country over
time through an analysis of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. It argues that important
processes underpinning the spread of insurgency are likely to change with shifts in
the relative military capacity of belligerents. Importantly, insurgents can to a greater
extent spread the insurgency by using coercion, material incentives, and movement
of forces when they are militarily strong than when they are weak. This in turn leads
to changes in the local conditions favorable to insurgency. I hypothesize that
inaccessible terrains, preexisting rebel networks, and proximity to insurgent areas
are likely to be important determinants of local insurgency onset during rebel
weakness, but should decline in importance as the rebels gain strength. I find support
for these arguments in a mixed-methods analysis of Nepal’s insurgency that
combines a qualitative narrative and a quantitative event history analysis.
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Quantitative studies of civil war processes tend to assume that similar mechanisms
operate throughout a conflict and that explanatory variables therefore have constant
effects. Studies of Nepal’s civil war, for instance, have modeled spatial variation in
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levels of violence using exclusively preconflict local conditions, and assumed that
these conditions mattered equally in all phases of the conflict (e.g., Do and Iyer
2010; Nepal, Bohara, and Gawande 2011). But there are good reasons to believe that
this assumption does not hold. In particular, we know that the distribution of military
power between belligerents may change over the course of a war (Christia 2012).
Such changes are likely to influence belligerents’ available options and strategic
calculus, which plausibly affects conflict processes like violence and mobilization.
This article looks at how changes in relative capacity affect the emergence and
spread of insurgent activity within a country over time. Relative capacity matters for
how and where insurgency spreads, I argue, by affecting three central considerations
for the rebel organization: survival, mobilization, and power projection. First, relatively
weaker rebels have a greater need to hide from state forces than do stronger rebels. This
suggests that inaccessible areas should be particularly prone to the rise of insurgency
during rebel weakness, but less so when rebels have greater capacity. Second, weak
rebels tend to depend more on voluntary collaboration by local people than do stronger
rebels, who have a greater coercive and financial capacity to incentivize collaboration.
This suggests that local preexisting rebel networks will be especially advantageous
during rebel weakness and decline in importance if the rebels gain strength. Finally,
weak rebels tend to have a lower capacity to project power across large distances than
do stronger rebels, since they have fewer and less mobile forces. One may therefore
expect that proximity to insurgent strongholds should be more important for the
spread of insurgency during relative rebel weakness than during rebel strength.
I assess these arguments through an analysis of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal
(1996–2006), a case of strong growth in rebel capacity relative to the state over time.
Arising from a small party with meager resources and a few pockets of support, the
insurgency grew to encompass nearly the entire country within a decade. I first
provide a qualitative narrative describing the processes underlying the spread of
insurgency in different phases of the conflict. Implications of the theory are then
assessed statistically using district-level event history models of insurgency onset,
defined as the beginning of local rebel activity that includes lethal violence. As
hypothesized, in the initial period of rebel weakness, inaccessibility, preexisting
local Maoist networks, and proximity to areas with ongoing insurgency strongly
increased the likelihood of insurgency onset, but the influence of all these conditions
diminished with time and increase in rebel capacity relative to the state.
Overall, the analysis demonstrates the importance of contextualizing micro-level
analyses by taking into account how changes at the macro level—not the least
in relative capacity—affect local processes. It also suggests that we might need
to reconsider propositions that factors like rough terrain in general ‘‘should favor
insurgency and civil war’’ (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 80). The extent to which it favors
insurgency is likely to depend on the balance of power between belligerents, which is
not constant across conflicts or periods within conflicts. This insight may also help
explain why previous studies have found widely different effects of factors such as road
access on insurgent violence across conflicts (e.g., Do and Iyer 2010; Zhukov 2012).
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The article is structured as follows: I briefly discuss the literature on insurgency
processes, highlighting the puzzling variability of findings and the gaps in research
on the spread of insurgency. Next, I lay out the arguments for how relative capacity
matters to the spread of insurgency and derive hypotheses from them. The empirical
analysis begins with the qualitative narrative and continues with the quantitative test.
In the conclusion, I discuss the scope of the arguments and their implications for the
study of civil war dynamics more generally.
The Puzzling Variability of Rebellions
In the early 2000s, theories about the causes of civil wars tended to assume consider-
able homogeneity of key processes, like mobilization and warfare, across and within
civil wars (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Recent research,
especially at the subnational level, has proven such assumptions problematic by
demonstrating that these processes vary across and within civil wars. Reasons for
joining a rebel group, for instance, have been found to differ considerably even within
groups, spanning ideology, fear, profit, revenge, and adventure (Arjona and Kalyvas
2012; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Viterna 2006). The same applies to the
methods organizations use to mobilize people, which range from coercion and abduc-
tion (Beber and Blattman 2013) to persuasion (Eck 2010; Wood 2003). Warfare—
another central aspect of civil wars—also takes different forms across civil wars
(Kalyvas and Balcells 2010) and sometimes also within them (Lockyer 2010).
Subnational studies also suggest that the conditions fueling insurgency may differ
across and within cases. Consider the relationship between road access and rebel
activity: from Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) model of insurgency, which emphasizes
insurgents’ need to hide from government forces, one should expect rebel activity
to occur mostly in areas poorly served by roads. Some studies, including several
from Nepal (Do and Iyer 2010; Murshed and Gates 2005), indeed find that more
conflict-related violence occurred in areas far from roads, but areas with better road
access have been found to attract more violence in conflicts in Central Africa
(Raleigh and Hegre 2009) and the North Caucasus (Zhukov 2012). How can we
explain such differences in the environments where insurgencies thrive?
While there has been some theorizing about why warfare varies (Butler and Gates
2009; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010), little has been done to address this question. I
argue that variation in the geographic locus of insurgency, much like variation in
warfare, is closely related to the relative military capacity of the combating organi-
zations. To show this, I look at where violent insurgent activity emerges and spreads
within a country when a rebel group begins weak but grows stronger over time.
The Growth and Spread of Insurgency
Many studies have explored which areas tend to see most violence during civil war,
but relatively few have looked at the subnational growth and spread of insurgency
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from a spatial angle.1 This also applies to the literature on the Maoist insurgency
in Nepal. Several studies have sought to identify preconflict local determinants of
violence throughout that conflict or in a certain period of it (Do and Iyer 2010;
Murshed and Gates 2005; Nepal, Bohara, and Gawande 2011). By design, these
studies do not capture changes in processes over time. Do and Iyer (2010) is the only
study analyzing the spread of Nepal’s insurgency.2 While their study takes a step
toward capturing conflict dynamics, it does not include any time-varying covariates.
The model thereby rests on an implausible assumption that the emergence of insur-
gency in one area is independent of conflict processes in nearby areas and develop-
ments at the macro level.
Beyond the Nepal literature, there are also some studies looking at the spatiotem-
poral dimensions of insurgency. Several of them are mainly descriptive, however.
Townsley, Johnson, and Ratcliffe (2008), for instance, look at the extent to which
insurgent violence is clustered in time and space, while Schutte and Weidmann
(2011) look at the extent to which violence follows a relocation pattern, shifting
from one place to another, or an expansion pattern,3 remaining in its original place
while emerging other places. Sa´nchez, Solimano, and Formisano’s (2005) study of
spatiotemporal patterns of violence in Colombia has a more explanatory orientation.
Interestingly, they find that some local conditions, like political polarization, were
strongly associated with more violence in the first period of La Violencia but not
in the last period. However, they do not offer much theory to help make sense of this.
There is a shortage of theoretical work on the geographic spread of insurgency.
One influential contribution is McColl’s (1969) account of how revolutionary
insurgencies evolve, which is based on several case narratives. Revolutionary insur-
gencies, he argues, have a ‘‘territorial imperative’’ of establishing ‘‘base areas’’ and
developing them into insurgent states within the state. He divides an insurgency pro-
cess into three phases (very similar to Mao’s strategic phases): first, the ‘‘mobile
phase,’’ in which revolutionaries turn to remote rural areas to mobilize while hiding
from state forces. After some base areas are established comes the ‘‘guerilla phase’’
in which insurgent influence spreads out from the bases and approaches urban
centers. If the insurgents manage to develop their military capacity to match the
government, the conflict enters an ‘‘equilibrium phase’’ in which the government
concentrates its forces in larger cities and the insurgents develop their base areas into
states within the state. Although McColl’s study provides useful ideas, it does not
pay much attention to exactly what processes drive the spread of insurgency and
which mechanisms cause strategic changes. I now turn to these issues.
Relative Capacity and Coordinated Expansion
Insurgent collective action can arguably spread through three ideal-type processes:
first, isolated growth, where people in one place independently decide to rebel with-
out any external influence; second, coordinated expansion, in which organized
agents trigger collective action across places using tools like coercion, training, or
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organizational development; and third, diffusion, in which people in one place
decide to rebel on the basis of considering others’ practices elsewhere, without any
coordination involved.4 Practices may diffuse in several ways, including through
learning and imitation (Elkins and Simmons 2005).
In modern-era insurgencies, coordinated expansion is likely to predominate.
While peasant or anticolonial rebellions before the mid-twentieth century could
involve more or less disconnected communities rising in rebellion (Tilly 1978,
185-87), this has rarely been the case for rebellions thereafter. From World War II,
the technology used by most rebels developed toward ‘‘robust insurgency,’’ involv-
ing a strong rebel organization usually led by educated elites and supported by
transnational networks (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). The leaders focused on car-
ving out base areas within the state where they could mobilize, train, and educate
their forces. In such insurgencies, the rebel organization’s allocation of military,
organizational, and political resources will strongly influence where insurgent
activity takes place.
Several considerations affect where a rebel organization chooses to invest its
resources at a certain point in time. First, rebel leaders are likely to invest resources
where they think local conditions are conducive to insurgency, especially emphasizing
the prospects of survival in the face of counterinsurgency and mobilization of
human and material resources. Second, it will consider the feasibility and cost
of projecting power from one area to another. All these considerations are likely
to be shaped by the relative military capacity of the rebels and the government.
This in turn means that the conditions under which we are likely to see insurgency
arise will change with developments in relative capacity over time. Subsequently, I
explain how each of these considerations hinges on relative capacity and derive
hypotheses about the expected spatiotemporal trajectory of conflicts where rebel
relative capacity grows over time.
Survival and Accessibility
For militarily weak rebels, staying alive is a most important preoccupation. Guevara
([1961] 1998, 172), for instance, wrote that ‘‘[o]ur mission, in the first hour, shall be
to survive . . . ’’ As long as they are militarily inferior to government forces, the
rebels will be safer in inaccessible areas weakly penetrated by state administration.
Difficult terrains like mountains or dense forest, scattered settlements without roads,
and long distance from centers of state power all raise the cost for the government of
asserting control and tracking down the insurgents (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Buhaug
2010). We should therefore expect militarily weak insurgents first to turn to rela-
tively inaccessible, but still settled areas.
If the rebels grow militarily stronger, however, the benefit from hiding in
remote areas wanes. One reason is that the formation of larger military units and
procurement of heavy weaponry may allow the insurgents to withstand attacks.
Another is that the insurgents will gain safety in numbers; more manpower enables
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them to expand their area of activity, which makes it difficult for the government to
concentrate its forces and carry out devastating, large-scale attacks. This gives the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: When a rebel group is very weak compared to the counterinsur-
gent, insurgency onset is more likely in inaccessible areas; but as the group gains
relative strength, inaccessibility becomes less important for the likelihood of
insurgency onset.
Mobilization and Preexisting Ties
Insurgents also need to ensure that local populations collaborate and provide mate-
rial resources. At the minimum, they rely on local people for food, and as long as
they are vulnerable to government attacks, they must avoid information leaks to
government agents (Kalyvas 2006; Leites and Wolf 1970, 10). The tools that rebel
organizations can use to obtain such collaboration are likely to depend on their
military strength: while they are weak, they usually lack the capacity to enforce
compliance and the means to offer economic incentives for collaboration. In this
situation, they are likely to focus on fostering political sympathy and emotional
attachment to their cause (Wood 2003) as well as solidarity and networks that
create social incentives for collaboration (Petersen 2001). Since forging strong
social ties and building mass political support are demanding and time-consuming
tasks (Fireman and Gamson 1979, 22), it is advantageous for the rebels to concentrate
their efforts where they already have some social and organizational ties to local
populations. In agreement with this, much case evidence suggests that weak
rebel groups initially tend to mobilize mainly among people they are already polit-
ically or socially connected with (Viterna 2006, 21-24; Weinstein 2007, 108-11;
Wickham-Crowley 1992, 138-53).
As a rebel group develops military and financial strength, its repertoire of tools
for mobilization also expands. In particular, it becomes better able to induce people
to cooperate through offering protection and economic benefits for cooperation and
threatening punishment for defection. In addition, people or groups perceiving that
they may gain from the political order the rebels are fighting for may find it expe-
dient to cooperate with the insurgents. Rebels are therefore likely to become less
dependent on preexisting ties to local populations. One observable implication of
this argument is the following:
Hypothesis 2: When a rebel group is very weak relative to the counterinsurgent,
insurgency onset is more likely where the rebels have preexisting ties to the
population; but as the group gains strength, preexisting ties become less important
for the likelihood of insurgency onset.
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Power Projection and Proximity
Whether insurgent activity begins in an area at a certain time will also depend on the
rebels’ ability to move their forces and cadres from one place to another (Zhukov
2012). The entry of insurgents from outside is likely to be especially important for
insurgent activity to take hold in areas without strong preexisting rebel ties. In such
areas, they may act as political entrepreneurs, offer protection and training to local
recruits, and carry out attacks.
The ability to project power, however, is likely to be closely associated with
rebel military capacity (Buhaug 2010). An important reason is that insurgents in
irregularly fought civil wars are likely to mainly expand their area of activity rather
than to relocate to new areas (Schutte and Weidmann 2011).5 Mao’s policy of gra-
dual expansion from the countryside to the cities is the typical pattern. While the
rebels seek to enter the cities, they are not willing to give up their established
power in the countryside. Irregular wars are also therefore typically characterized
by fragmented sovereignty, in which most areas are not fully controlled by any
party, and where the rebels usually continue activities even where the government
is more powerful (Kalyvas 2006). Since they seek expansion, a weak rebel group
cannot afford to send many cadres across large distances. It is more likely to send
cadres to nearby areas from where they can easily return to the base for supplies
and to aid in combat. If the rebels manage to build up a large surplus of forces
in an area, however, it becomes feasible to transfer divisions far from their origins.
As a consequence, proximity takes on a more important role for insurgent expan-
sion when the rebels are weak than when they are strong. The following hypothesis
can be derived from this argument:
Hypothesis 3: When a rebel group is very weak, insurgency onset is more likely
where there is ongoing insurgent activity in nearby areas, but as the group gains
strength, proximity to insurgency-affected areas becomes less important for the
likelihood of insurgency onset.
The Evolution of Insurgency in Nepal
The Maoist insurgency in Nepal from 1996 to 2006 is a suitable case for exploring
these hypotheses. First, it encompassed much temporal variation in relative military
capacities: the Maoists began as a very weak armed group but over time became
strong enough to offer considerable resistance to the government army and, second,
the country offers large spatial variation in several variables of interest, such as
accessibility and preexisting Maoist ties.
The next section offers a brief qualitative account of how the insurgency evolved,
including some evidence suggesting that the theorized processes were present. I here
draw upon interviews by the author in March and April 2010 with political leaders and
villagers in Rolpa and Syangja district as well as various secondary sources.
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Emergence and Early Spread of the Maoist Insurgency
The Maoist insurgency arose during a turbulent period. In 1990, a swift nonviolent
popular uprising backed by most of the political parties ended thirty years of mon-
archical rule. The new constitution restored multiparty democracy, but, to protests
from the far-left and minority organizations, Nepal remained a centralized Hindu
state with Nepali as the only official language, and the king retained considerable
powers. Some far-left parties nonetheless participated in the 1991 parliamentary
election under the United People’s Front (UPF) alliance, which gained 5 percent
of national votes and nine seats in parliament. Disagreements soon arose within the
UPF over the question of armed revolution, however. This led to a split in 1994, after
which one faction took the name CPN-Maoist and began preparing for insurgency.
On February 13, 1996, they launched the insurgency with attacks in various parts of
the country (International Crisis Group [ICG] 2005, 22).
The Maoists began as a very weak rebel outfit. Political support and organiza-
tional networks were strong only in a few remote districts. Their military forces con-
sisted of a couple hundred fighters with simple training and mostly homemade guns.
The government, in comparison, had an army of about 43,000 in addition to a police
force of 28,000 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1996/1997–2006/2007).
Realizing their initial weakness vis-a`-vis the government, the Maoists during the
first five years saw themselves in Mao’s phase of ‘‘strategic defense,’’ and concen-
trated on developing organizational and military capacity and creating ‘‘base areas’’
in the countryside (Gates and Miklian 2011). Advancements were made on all points
during these years, much aided by a weak response by the unstable governments in
Kathmandu. Despite hundreds being killed and Maoist influence growing in the
countryside, only the police force was used against the rebels up to late 2001, when
the army became involved.
In the first year of the insurgency, Maoist activity was highly concentrated in the
districts of Rolpa and Rukum in the Midwestern Hills region (Figure 1). This was
partly the result of preceding efforts by the central Maoist organization to make this
area the main stronghold of the insurgency. Already from 1994, the party brought
political entrepreneurs and military specialists from other places to mobilize and
provide training in Rolpa and Rukum (Gersony 2003, 37).6 In accordance with the
hypotheses, the area was quite inaccessible due to forested, hilly terrain, and lack of
roads. Also, the Maoist party had a uniquely strong foothold here. When explaining
why they initially focused their activities here, CPN-Maoist chairman Pushpa Kamal
Dahal, a.k.a. ‘‘Prachanda,’’ also highlighted these factors, mentioning the ‘‘consis-
tent revolutionary leadership’’ of the area and that ‘‘there are no transportation facil-
ities, there is no electricity, and communication is also very weak for the ruling
classes’’ (Onesto 2000).
Processes in this area after the insurgency began also fit the theory well. Its inac-
cessibility greatly impeded the counterinsurgency by forcing the police to spread its
forces thinly to cover the major villages in the districts. This left them without firm
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control almost anywhere and made it possible for the Maoists to capture arms and
ammunition by raiding poorly manned police stations (Marks 2003). Preexisting
rebel networks also aided the growth of insurgency: they provided a pool of loyal
collaborators in the villages to whom the insurgents went for food, shelter, and infor-
mation. Furthermore, several Maoist recruits mentioned links to active insurgents as
important for their decision to join (Holtermann, in press).7
It was not until late 1997 that insurgent activity started taking hold also in other
districts. The insurgency expanded to two types of areas: first, to Midwestern dis-
tricts nearby the strongholds of Rukum and Rolpa and, second, to a few scattered
districts in the Western and Central Hills, which had relatively strong preexisting
local Maoist movements.8 The expansion in the Midwest was driven to a large extent
by movement of insurgents from Rolpa and Rukum to adjacent districts. Most of
these districts lacked a strong preexisting Maoist movement, which hindered rapid
bottom-up growth of insurgency. It was only with the infusion of coercive and orga-
nizational resources from outside that the insurgency gained a strong local foothold
(Gersony 2003, 71). The Maoists only became able to do this from late 1997, when
they began developing larger squads which were to become mobile and not tied up to
specific districts (Onesto 2005, 94-95). Still, in accordance with the theory, during
this phase of limited military capacity they did not move many fighters far away
from their stronghold. Most insurgents instead traveled back and forth from the
‘‘Main Zone’’ of Rolpa and Rukum to nearby districts, so-called Associated Zones
(Onesto 2005, 200).9
In the few spots beyond the Midwestern Hills where insurgency began, the pro-
cesses were more bottom-up and based on the preexisting local movement. The
distance from the ‘‘Main Zone’’ precluded the inflow of large contingents of insur-
gents from outside. A Maoist leader from Gorkha district, for instance, said that it
took time to build up insurgent capacity because of the need to recruit locally in the
Figure 1. Ecological zone map of Nepal.
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context of harsh counterinsurgency (Onesto 2005, 77). Their location relatively
close to Kathmandu also made the movements in these districts more vulnerable
to counterinsurgency campaigns (Onesto 2005, 79). These challenges may help
explain that insurgency did not spread rapidly from these spots of insurgent activity
outside the Midwest in the initial years.
Spread of the Insurgency in the Later Years
The Maoist slowly built up military capacity over the initial years, and by early 2000
they had pushed the police out of the villages in their stronghold districts. Their new
control in the countryside allowed them to introduce regular, general taxes and begin
conscription-like recruitment drives (Ogura 2005). These resources enabled them to
rapidly build capacity, and in 2001 they formed a ‘‘People’s Liberation Army’’ with
mobile forces up to the brigade level. They were still weaker than the Royal Nepalese
Army, especially in terms of weaponry, but they now presented a significant military
challenge (Mehta and Lawoti 2010). In line with the theory, the increase in capacity
was followed by a strategic shift in which the Maoists turned attention toward more
central, accessible areas. In February 2001, they adopted an offensive strategy
named ‘‘Prachanda Path,’’ aiming for a ‘‘great leap forward’’ by expanding the
insurgency to the big cities, including Kathmandu, and the economically important
Terai plains toward India (CPN-Maoist 2001).
The planned offensive was interrupted by events in Kathmandu, however. In June
2001, King Birendra and most of the royal family were massacred by the crown
prince, and Birendra’s brother assumed the throne. Soon after, the government
declared a ceasefire, and high-level negotiations began for the first time. The gov-
ernment was unwilling to consider the key Maoist demand of an elected constituent
assembly, however, and in November 2001, the Maoists attacked the army for the
first time. The next few months saw a large spike in violence, as the army became
fully engaged in the conflict. Moreover, the insurgency spread rapidly and would
encompass almost the entire country only two years later.
As expected, the insurgency became less spatially bound in this period, and
expansion took place also far away from Maoist strongholds. A major reason for this
was interregional movements of large groups of insurgents. During the ceasefire
from July to November 2001, many guerillas were transferred from Maoist strong-
holds to the new frontiers (Nayak 2007, 926). The import of rebels from outside
could be decisive in the local growth of insurgency. In Syangja in the Western Hills,
for instance, the armed conflict took hold after a raid in November 2001 in which a
large rebel force, mostly composed of nonlocals, seized the district headquarters for
five hours.10
Coercion also became a larger element of Maoist mobilization efforts, as the
theory would suggest. In places where the Maoists initially relied on volunteers for
help and used violence only against active opponents, they began threatening pun-
ishment of anyone who did not pay taxes or perform various tasks.11 They also
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increasingly used abduction as a recruitment method; only in 2002, more Maoist
abductions were registered than in the entire 1996–2001 period (Eck 2010, chap.
3, 11). Generally, accounts from this period suggest that Maoist rule to a consider-
able extent had become associated with fear of punishment (Lecomte-Tilouine 2009;
Ogura 2005; Pettigrew and Adhikari 2009).
The increase in Maoist power also made other actors more interested in allying
with them to reap future gains. From around 2002, for instance, the Maoists con-
structed an alliance with the largest regional political movement of the Terai, the
Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF). In exchange for the Maoists promoting regional
autonomy and Madhesi rights, the MJF supplied the insurgency with activists and
legitimacy (Gates and Miklian 2011, 427). This became a gate opener to the region,
where the Maoists had almost no political foothold, and eased the spread of insur-
gency to most of the Terai during 2002 and 2003 (ICG 2011, 7).
As expected, the spread of insurgency predominantly took the form of expansion
rather than relocation. The Maoists did not abandon their original areas, as they
moved into the cities and the plains. Rather, the Midwestern Hills remained their key
stronghold throughout the conflict, and their central leadership was based there
during the later years (Roy 2008, 122). After the Maoists gained control of most
of the Midwest during 2002, the bulk of violence shifted to more contested regions
(Figure 2). But, as expected due to the irregular nature of the conflict, violence did
not entirely seize in any region.
In 2004, the rebels declared the start of a last ‘‘strategic offense’’ phase, but it
soon became apparent that they were not able to take the major cities, and a stale-
mate followed. The situation rapidly changed after the King dismissed the govern-
ment and formed his own war cabinet in February 2005. Having been sidelined by
the king, the large parties entered an alliance with the Maoists in November 2005 to
regain power. The alliance initiated, but did not fully control, a popular uprising in
April 2006, which forced the king to step down. The following negotiations between
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the Maoist and the new government led to a peace agreement in November 2006 that
ended the war (ICG 2006).
Quantitative Analysis
Design and Model
While the narrative suggests that the processes outlined in the theory were present,
systematic comparisons are needed to assess the hypotheses. I use district-level
event history models for this purpose. The district is a suitable level of analysis
because the theory concerns where and when armed insurgency became entrenched,
rather than the precise location of rebel violence. At a lower geographic level, like
the Village Development Committee, violence is likely to be driven to a larger extent
by tactical choices of insurgents in the district. Moreover, the district was an impor-
tant organizational level for the Maoists, especially in the initial years, when the
main armed squads were under district command, but also later in the war, when
‘‘District People’s Governments’’ had strong financial powers (ICG 2005, 14; Ogura
2005, 185).12
The dependent variable, insurgency onset, is defined as the beginning of local
rebel activity that includes lethal violence and operationalized as the first time a dis-
trict experiences at least five days of lethal insurgent violence within any half-year
period.13 I use violent events data collected by the Informal Sector Service Center
(INSEC), a Nepalese NGO with representatives documenting violence in every dis-
trict throughout the conflict (INSEC 2010). A low threshold of violence is appro-
priate because I am concerned with the onset, and not the intensity, of violence.
The reason for choosing a threshold above one event day is to reduce the potential
for Maoist raids organized from outside a district to influence the measure.14
I use a conditional logit model grouped on onset dates to estimate how the explan-
atory variables affected where insurgency arose at different points in time. This
model derives estimates by combining results from binary outcome analyses at each
onset date (representing a ‘‘failure’’ in survival analysis terminology).15 Each day
one or more districts see onset, the onset district or districts are compared to all other
districts that have not yet seen insurgency onset. This makes it possible to trace
insurgency dynamics at the finest possible time scale (Raknerud and Hegre 1997)
and avoid imposing assumptions about the distribution of onsets over time.
Explanatory Variables
The central variable in the first hypothesis, accessibility (from the government’s
perspective), is primarily a function of three variables: terrain, infrastructure, and
distance from the capital. I measure the concept using an index (accessibility) com-
bining the percentage forest cover, the average slope of the terrain, the length of
roads per square kilometers (square root transformed), and the distance from the
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district headquarter to the capital, Kathmandu.16 Similar weight is given to terrain
(one-sixth weight for each of the two terrain variables), roads (one-third weight), and
distance (one-third weight) in the index.17
Preinsurgency Maoist organizational networks are proxied by the percentage of
district votes for the UPF, the precursor of the CPN-Maoist, in the 1991 parliamen-
tary election (UPF support).18
Proximity to insurgent areas is captured by a dummy variable recording for each
district whether any adjacent district saw ongoing insurgency at any onset date in the
country (nearby insurgency).
To assess the argument that the role of preinsurgency rebel networks, proximity
to insurgent areas, and accessibility changed over the course of the conflict, I interact
these variables with the time (in years) since the insurgency began (time).19
Further, I argued that temporal contingency was mainly due to the rebels gaining
military strength relative to the government over time. I assess this by interacting the
explanatory variables with measures of relative capacity. The first measure is the
number of rebel full-time combatants as a percentage of government forces
(rebel-to-government troops).20 Available information on rebel combatants is not
very precise. For the first couple of years, the only available estimates come from
Maoist commanders (Ogura 2008, 31; Onesto 2005, 90). From 1999, the Military
Balance gives yearly estimates of rebel troops (International Institute for Strategic
Studies 1996/1997–2006/2007).21 Government officials also gave estimates of rebel
troops at several points during the conflict, some of which differed considerably
from those in the Military Balance.22
Since rebel troops data are uncertain, I construct an additional, less direct
measure: the average daily number of government force fatalities over time (gov.
force fatalities). Government force fatalities indicate relative capacity because weak
rebels are likely to try to avoid clashes with government forces (Hultman 2007).
Government force fatalities also depend on other strategic considerations, however.
To reduce the influence of short-term fluctuations due to such considerations, I cal-
culate a moving average of daily government force fatalities in a six-month period:
three months before and three months after the date in question. Further, I remove
periods with ceasefire when calculating the moving average, giving these periods the
value of the preceding date.23
Data for government troops are much more reliable and are found in the Military
Balance. The army is excluded up to 2002, since it was not mobilized against the
rebels until late November 2001. The number of government troops increased
greatly after 2001 because the army became involved and both the army and the
armed police force were expanded.
Figure 3 shows the development of relative capacity over time, using two
measures of rebel-to-government troops—one based on the Military Balance and
one on government sources—as well as the government force fatalities measure.24
There is considerable variation between the measures. In particular, the Maoists
gained strength earlier according to the government estimates of rebel troops than
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the other measures suggest. Still, all three measures suggest that the Maoists became
much stronger over the first half of the conflict. In the following analyses, I use two
of these measures: the rebel-to-government troops estimates from the Military Bal-
ance and the daily government force fatalities measure. The results are very similar
using rebel troop estimates from government sources (Online Appendix). The
sources, summary statistics, and correlations for all the variables are found in the
Online Appendix, Tables A5 and A6.
Control Variables
Several studies of Nepal’s Maoist conflict have argued that poverty fuelled the rebel-
lion (e.g., Do and Iyer 2010). Poverty may ease recruitment, since lower regular
income opportunities reduce the opportunity cost of becoming a full-time rebel
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Furthermore, the Maoists’ political program, like that
of many other leftist rebel groups, appealed to the poor by focusing on wealth redis-
tribution.25 I use the Human Development Index (HDI ) based on the 2001 national
census as a broad indicator of poverty.26 There is a risk of endogeneity bias since the
data are collected five years into the insurgency, but it is likely to be small since
these variables tend to change slowly and violence was quite limited up to this time.
It has also been argued that peasant dependency on landowners facilitated Maoist
mobilization (Joshi and Mason 2008). As a proxy for peasant dependency, I use the
percentage of rural households working under any form of tenancy arrangement in
2001 (tenants).
Figure 3. Comparison of relative capacity measures.
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Diffusion through mass media channels has been found to be important in studies
of riots and protests (Lipsky 1968; Myers 2000). While it is unlikely to be equally
important in insurgency, which is a more coordinated phenomenon, it could still play
some role. People sympathizing with the rebels might be inspired by, or learn from,
news of rebel activities elsewhere. Moreover, news about dramatic events may
prompt discussions, or ‘‘occasions for deciding,’’ which gives a chance for rebel
sympathizers to signal their stands and unite (Oliver 1989). On the other hand, the
government may use mass media to spread antirebel views or deterrent messages
discouraging people from rebelling. I use the percentage of households owning radio
in a district (radio ownership) as an indicator of access to mass media. Radio was the
primary news source during the conflict, since both TV and newspapers were rare
outside the big cities (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2004,
129). The indicator is also likely to capture important variations in mass media
access since rates of radio ownership varied considerably across the country. Nota-
bly, however, in most places, the only station was the government-controlled Radio
Nepal, which spread anti-Maoist messages.27
Several scholars have suggested that the culture of certain ‘‘indigenous nationality’’
groups—particularly the Magars of Rolpa and Rukum—might have eased Maoist
mobilization (de Sales 2000; Ramirez 2004). I therefore control for the percentage
of Magars in a district (Magars). To assess the more general argument about dis-
advantaged ethnic/caste groups tending to support the Maoists, I also include the
proportion of high-caste hill groups in a district (hill high castes).28
I also include an indicator of broader leftist support: the number of district mandates
for any self-declared communist party (communist mandates) in the 1991 election
(Election Commission 1992). This may help distinguish the impacts of organizational
networks, which the UPF support variable is meant to capture, and ideological support.
Finally, I control for the logged district population for 1991, which is relevant
primarily because some Himalayan districts are very thinly settled, making them of
little political interest.
Results
Table 1 shows results from four conditional logit models of insurgency onset. The
first model includes all district-level variables but no interaction terms, and thereby
rests on the typical assumption that all variables have constant effects over time.
Model 2 includes interactions between each of the three main variables and time
since the initiation of insurgency. The interaction terms are jointly significant at the
1 percent level according to a likelihood ratio test, strongly suggesting that the vari-
ables have time-varying effects. All interaction terms are in the expected direction:
Accessibility was associated with a lower likelihood of onset at the conflict’s
midpoint, but this association faded over time, as shown by the positive interaction
term; preexisting Maoist networks (UPF support) increased the likelihood of onset,
but its impact also declined over time; and a similar pattern is found for nearby
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insurgency. Notably, the table does not give a full picture of these contingent effects,
since the estimates only refer to the main variable’s impact when the modifying vari-
able is held at its sample mean. I look more closely at these contingent effects
subsequently.
The third model employs interactions with rebel-to-government troops instead of
time. The results are in agreement with the three hypotheses. The signs of all the
interaction terms remain the same, but the accessibility interaction coefficient
becomes somewhat weaker. In model 4, the three main variables are interacted with
the second measure of relative capacity, government force fatalities. The results do
not change much, providing additional support for the argument that relative capac-
ity moderates the role of accessibility, preexisting rebel ties, and nearby insurgency.
Neither of the two socioeconomic control variables, HDI and tenants, signifi-
cantly affects the likelihood of onset, which indicates that socioeconomic conditions
played a lesser role in insurgency processes in Nepal than what previous studies have
suggested (e.g., Do and Iyer 2010; Joshi and Mason 2008).29 Radio ownership, hill
high castes, and communist mandates are also not significantly associated with
insurgency onset. Somewhat unexpectedly, Magars is significantly related to a
lower chance of onset in the final three models. Finally, a larger district population
is positively associated with onset, as expected.
The three hypotheses can only be properly assessed through a more complete
demonstration of contingent effects. I use a simulation-based approach to estimate
the main variables’ effects on the likelihood of onset at different levels of time
since initiation and rebel-to-government troops (Brambor, Clark, and Golder
2006). Figure 4 shows the estimated relative change in the odds of onset when mov-
ing the continuous variables, UPF support and accessibility, from the lower to the
upper quartile, and the dichotomous variable, nearby insurgency, from 0 to 1, over
different values of time (left panels) and rebel-to-government troops (right panels).
The topmost panels show how the effect of accessibility on the likelihood of onset
changed over time and relative capacity. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, inaccessible
districts were more likely to see insurgency when the rebels were weak, but the vari-
able’s impact declined as time passed and the rebels gained strength. When the
rebels were at their weakest, districts in the upper accessibility quartile had an esti-
mated 70 percent (þ22/83 percent) lower odds of onset than districts in the lower
accessibility quartile. The reduction in impact is clearest for the interactions with
time: at the end of the period, inaccessible districts were no more likely to see insur-
gency onset than accessible districts, judging by the mean estimate. The estimate
changes less, but still considerably, with rebel-to-government troops. From the lowest
to the highest point of rebel strength, the variable’s negative influence more than
halved, according to the mean estimate. This might suggest that relative capacity was
an important, although not the only, driver of temporal contingency for accessibility.
The middle panels show how the impact of UPF support varied over time and
over relative capacity. The results support Hypothesis 2: when the rebels were at
their weakest, the variable had a strong positive influence: the odds of onset
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increased by 50 percent (+25 percent) when moving from the lower quartile (0
percent of votes) to the upper quartile (3.3 percent of votes). As time passed and
rebel capacity increased, its influence gradually declined. Greater UPF support
was significantly related to a higher odds of onset only when the rebel army was
below 4 percent of the size of the government army and up to around five years
into the insurgency.
Figure 4. Contingent effect estimates. Estimated effects of main variables over time since
initiation (left panels) and rebel-to-government troops (right panels).
Note: Accessibility and UPF support are moved from the lower to the upper quartile; nearby insurgency (a
dummy) is moved from 0 to 1. Odds ratio ¼ 1 (no effect) marked with a thin red line. The y ¼ axis is
logged for the nearby insurgency graphs.
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The lower panels show that the impact of nearby insurgency also declined with
time as well as with relative insurgent strength, as suggested in Hypothesis 3. For
this variable, the conditioning effect of time is stronger and more certain than that
of rebel-to-government troops, however, suggesting that there might be more to the
temporal contingency than changes in relative capacity. Ongoing insurgency in adja-
cent districts was significantly related to insurgency onset until the rebel army
reached about 4 percent of the government army’s size and up to around 4.5 years
into the insurgency. When the rebels were at their weakest, the mean estimate sug-
gests that nearby insurgency gave a ten times increase in the odds of onset. The size
of the effect is highly uncertain, however, since very few districts had insurgency
nearby in this phase.
The results are robust to changes in the operationalization of insurgency onset as
well as relative capacity. The Online Appendix shows results when using a lower
threshold of onset, when both rebel and government violence are included in the
onset definition, when fatalities rather than violent events are used to operationalize
onset, and when using rebel troop estimates from government sources. Only the
interaction between accessibility and relative capacity is somewhat sensitive to the
operationalization of onset and relative capacity.30
Model Performance
How well do the models capture the spatiotemporal trajectory of Nepal’s insur-
gency? I use in-sample predictions to assess this.31 Since the conditional logit model
does not have an intercept, the predicted probabilities cannot be compared across the
entire sample.32 The models can instead be evaluated by the degree to which they
give higher predicted values to actual onset observations than to nononset observa-
tions on specific onset (‘‘failure’’) dates. Figure 5 shows maps displaying linear
predictions from model 3 as well as actual onset observations for five selected onset
dates. The first map is from the first onset date in the country. The next maps show
the situation for the onset date most proximate to the first onset date, February 25,
with a two-year lapse. Darker colors signify higher predicted values (in log odds).33
Districts with ongoing insurgency are in white.
The model predicts very well for the first date; Rukum, the district seeing onset,
has the clearly highest predicted value, not the least because no district had higher
preexisting Maoist support. The model performs well also for the 1998 onset; the
onset district, Salyan, has the second-highest predicted value of the remaining
districts. While Salyan did not have a preexisting Maoist movement, its location
in the Midwestern Hills, next to districts with ongoing insurgency, made it prone
to insurgency onset. Also for the February 2000 map, the onset district, Sindhupal-
chok, does not get the highest predicted value, but it is among the top five, due to it
bordering a district with ongoing insurgency and having some preexisting Maoist
support. The model does not perform equally well for the 2002 onset. By this time,
several key variables in the model have lost their impact, and the onset district,
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Chitwan, gets only the eleventh highest predicted value even though it had consid-
erable preexisting Maoist support and bordered districts with ongoing insurgency.
By 2004, the majority of districts had already seen onset, and the model does not
do very well in predicting the onset in Jumla, which received the seventh highest
predicted value. Taken together, the maps indicate that the model performs better
for the early period than the later. This makes sense because three variables—acces-
sibility, UPF support, and nearby insurgency—played a central role in the early
phase of high-power asymmetry but not in the more symmetric last phase.34
Figure 6 gives a more complete picture of the predictive performance of two of
the models: model 1, which does not include interaction terms, and model 3, which
includes interactions with rebel-to-government troops. It shows the percentage of
onset observations that get the highest ranked predicted values (left) or among the
Figure 5. Maps of actual insurgency onsets and predicted likelihoods of onset.
Note: Darker colors signify higher predicted values of onset (in log odds). Districts with ongoing insur-
gency are in white.
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five highest values (right) on their date of onset for these two models, and compares
them to the expectation from a random draw. Both models give predictions that are
far more accurate than the random draw. Model 3 is much preferable to model 1 on
Figure 5. (Continued)
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the first measure and slightly preferable for the second, which suggests that the
inclusion of interaction terms improves the model’s fit to the data.
Conclusion
Despite a surge in subnational analyses of civil war processes, little has been done to
explain how and where insurgencies emerge and spread within a country over time.
This article has provided a framework for analyzing this question. Most important, it
has shown how the mechanisms underlying the spread of insurgency are likely to
change with shifts in the relative capacity of the belligerents. Insurgency can, for
instance, to a greater extent be spread through use of coercion, material incentives,
and movement of forces when the rebel group is strong than when it is weak. This
in turn alters the impact of several local conditions on the likelihood of insurgency
arising at a certain point in time. I argue that inaccessibility, preexisting rebel ties,
and proximity to established insurgent bases are likely to be important determinants
of insurgency during rebel weakness, but should decline in importance as rebels gain
strength relative to the government.
I have shown that these arguments hold for the case of the Maoist insurgency in
Nepal by combining a qualitative narrative with a statistical event history analysis.
The extent to which the arguments can travel to other cases needs to be tested in future
studies, however, since it places high demands on data as well as case knowledge. One
plausible scope condition is that these arguments only hold for insurgencies aiming at
central power and not for other types of rebel movements, like ‘‘sons-of-the-soil’’
movements, which may not have similar incentives to spread their activity.
The study has significant implications for the study of civil war: first, it provides a
plausible explanation for the divergent conclusions from quantitative case studies
about the environments most likely to attract insurgent violence; this may be due to
differences in relative capacity across cases, since weak rebel groups are likely to
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thrive in different environments than strong rebel groups. This insight points to the
need for studies of civil war processes to take into account how macro-level changes,
especially in relative capacity, may affect micro-level processes. Rather than search
for the influence of various conditions on conflict processes in general, future studies
should identify whether a conflict comprises episodes in which distinct processes
operate and analyze the role of various conditions within each episode.
Relatedly, the findings suggest that the search for one universal effect of variables
such as rough terrain or road access on the risk of civil war onset should be aban-
doned. These variables are likely to matter more for asymmetric conflicts than for
more symmetric ones, which means that the traditional approach in cross-national
research of treating civil wars as homogenous across space and time is ill suited for
examining their role. More sophisticated cross-national studies will surely be made
possible, however, by the ongoing development of more actor-specific and tempo-
rally disaggregated cross-national data, including on relative capacity (Cunningham,
Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013; Gleditsch, Metternich, and Ruggeri 2014).
More generally, the analysis underscores that insurgency cannot be understood as
an accumulation of individuals or communities independently deciding to rebel, like
some economic theories assume. It instead tends to be a highly coordinated social
phenomenon in which belligerent organizations strongly shape local processes. This
insight is partly incorporated in prominent theories that emphasize local sources of
conflict, but still give attention to the role of belligerent organizations (e.g., Kalyvas
2006). Coordination and interdependence above the local level is nearly absent from
these theories, however. To gain a broader understanding of conflict dynamics, it
is not enough to study the interactions between organizations and populations in a
particular locality; we must also take into account how organizations make decisions
about where to invest their efforts and which tactics to apply where and when.
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Notes
1. The spread of armed conflict across country borders has received some more attention
(e.g., Beardsley 2011; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Lake and Rothchild 1998; Salehyan
and Gleditsch 2006).
2. A couple of articles analyze changes in Maoist strategy during the conflict using qualita-
tive data (Gates and Miklian 2011; Nayak 2007). Although useful, they do not directly
assess the mechanisms and conditions underlying the spread of insurgency.
3. Schutte and Weidmann use the term ‘‘escalation’’ instead of ‘‘expansion.’’
4. This framework draws on Elkins and Simmons’s (2005) typology of clustered decision
making. Notably, ‘‘diffusion’’ is sometimes used in a different way in the literature, as
any kind of spread of something within a system.
5. The extent of relocation compared to expansion is to some extent a matter of scale: at a
highly disaggregated spatiotemporal scale, one might expect violence to relocate in civil
wars. This is what Zhukov (2012) finds in the North Caucasus, using the municipality
month as the unit of analysis. On this scale, violence becomes rare, and it is to be expected
that many of the municipalities seeing violence one month do not see violence the next
month. This, however, does not necessarily mean that all insurgent activity has seized in
that place and relocated elsewhere.
6. Author’s interview with Man Bahadur Buddha Magar (‘‘Bikalpa’’), UCPN-Maoist
District Chairman for Rolpa, Liwang, Rolpa, March 13, 2010.
7. Author’s interviews with former Maoist combatants and villagers, Rolpa, March 2010.
8. The United People’s Front (UPF) had considerable electoral support in 1991 in these
districts, especially in Gorkha (31 percent of votes) and Kavre (14 percent; Election
Commission 1992).
9. Author’s interview with former Maoist combatant from Rolpa, March 13, 2010.
10. Author’s interview, Setidobhan, Syangja, April 28, 2010.
11. Author’s interviews with villagers in Rolpa, March 2010.
12. Reliable data below the district level are also lacking for several explanatory variables,
such as preexisting Maoist support and poverty. The median district has an area of
1,692 square kilometers2 and a population of 221,256.
13. Onset is coded for the date of the first insurgent killing followed by four additional days
of insurgent killings within the span of six months. I count event days rather than events
because it is sometimes unclear from Informal Sector Service Center’s (INSEC) data
whether fatalities on a certain day were part of the same incident.
14. The main results are robust to changes in the operationalization of insurgency onset
(Online Appendix).
15. The model is closely related to the Cox model (Cleves et al. 2008, 191). The estimates
subsequently are almost exactly similar using Cox regression, and the main inferences
hold for both models.
16. Indicators of prewar police and administrative capacity in the districts are lacking. This
may not be as important as accessibility, however, since the government could transfer
personnel between districts.
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17. A formative index is created because accessibility is plausibly determined by these
conditions, rather than vice versa.
18. This is a reasonably precise proxy. After the United People’s Front (UPF) split in 1994, only
three of its nine members of parliament joined the new Maoist party. Information is lacking on
whether entire UPF district committees switched to the non-Maoist faction. Indicative that this
rarely occurred, the Maoist party had district committees in thirty-five districts when insur-
gency began (Ogura 2008, 13), whereas the UPF received votes in forty-one districts in 1991.
19. This is a continuous variable (i.e., fractions of years are allowed).
20. I exclude militias from the measure mainly because their numbers are extremely uncertain.
Full-time combatants were also the most important force due to their better armament,
training, and mobility.
21. When a range is suggested, I use the mean estimate.
22. The sources are listed in the Online Appendix.
23. The three ceasefire periods were July 24 to November 22, 2001; January 29 to August 27,
2003; and September 3, 2005, to January 2, 2006 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2011).
24. Government estimates are missing for 2000, 2002 through 2004, and 2006. Numbers for
these years are estimated by linear interpolation and extrapolation. Both measures use the
Maoist commanders’ estimates for 1996–1997.
25. Poverty may not be unambiguously advantageous for the rebels; however, the poor may
be attracted by the salary offered to government forces or by rewards for denunciating
insurgents (Berman et al. 2011).
26. Human Development Index is an equally weighted index of life expectancy at birth, gross
domestic product per capita, and educational attainment (UNDP 2004, 112-16). Poverty
would preferably be measured using household survey data, but existing surveys do not
offer reliable district-level estimates. The Nepal Living Standards Survey I and II
(Central Bureau of Statistics 2004) surveys include as few as twenty-four respondents
in some rural districts.
27. ‘‘Community radio’’ stations began arising from 1996, but few licenses were granted
before 2006 (Pringle and Subba 2007, 8-11).
28. High-caste hill groups comprise Brahmins, Chhetris, and Thakuris. I exclude high-caste
groups in the Terai since the Madhesis in general have been politically marginal on the
national level.
29. There is some multicollinearity, but it does not appear to be a grave concern. The highest cor-
related variables are HDI and accessibility (r¼ 0.60) and HDI and radio ownership (r¼ 0.
60). variance inflation factor values (for model 1) are moderate: 4.2 for HDI is the highest.
30. In two of the eleven models tested, there is no sign that the impact of accessibility
declined as the rebels grew stronger.
31. The limited sample size precludes out-of-sample predictions.
32. Common approaches, such as the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plot, are
therefore not useful.
33. I show linear predictions using a ten equal intervals scale. I do not show absolute values
because they depend on the size of the remaining sample at the onset date and are therefore
not readily comparable.
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34. The spread of insurgency plausibly also became less predictable in general in the last
phase, since the insurgents had spread their influence to all regions and had considerable
capacity to project power.
Supplementary Material
The online appendices are available at http://jcr.sagepub.com/supplemental
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